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PLANNING PROBLEMS IN THE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY
DENNIS S. KARJALA*
One of the more important developments in corporation law in this
century has been the steady legislative and judicial recognition that rigid
statutory norms concerning internal divisions of power in closely held
incorporated enterprises serve little social purpose. Moreover, such rigidity
often results in the frustration of reasonable expectations when courts refuse
to enforce bargained-for agreements that violate the statutory norms. Today,
both special statutory schemes applicable to "close corporations" and
modem general corporation laws allow essentially complete freedom to the
participants in these corporate entities to fashion enforceable managerial
arrangements as they choose. The primary jurisprudential problem is no
longer the enforcement of bargained-for divisions of power (assuming
compliance with the requisite statutory formality), but rather the allocation
of rights and duties when the parties have failed to take advantage of the
planning opportunities available under the modem corporation statutes
The limited liability company statutes that have appeared so suddenly
raise similar jurisprudential problems.2 While the various statutes show a
good deal of individuality 3-a potentially undesirable retrogression in
business association law from essentially national statutory standards for
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University.
I. In earlier studies I have analyzed the planning problems for close corporations under the
modem corporation statutes and the extent to which those problems are aggravated or alleviated by
special close corporation legislation. Dennis S. Karijala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation
in the United States, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 663 (1989) [hereinafter Karijala, Analysis of Close Corporation
Legislation]; Dennis S. KarJala, A Second Look at Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEX. L.
REv. 1207 (1980) [hereinafter Karijala, A Second Look].
2. As of the time this Article was written, 47 states had adopted limited liability company
legislation. In addition, the three states without LLC statutes, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont, all
had LLC legislation pending in their legislatures. 2 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
RiBSTEIN & KEATiNGE ON LIMITED LIABI.ITY CoMpmAms app. D (1992 & Supp.).
3. For the purposes of this Article, I have considered just seven versions: the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act and the limited liability company legislation from Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Idaho, and Oregon. I chose these statutes to provide a sample of the kinds of variations that
are occurring, and I do not suggest that they are entirely representative of existing legislation. For a
more systematic comparison, see Patrick J.S. Inouye, Note, A Comparative Look at Oregon's Limited
Liabdity Company Act, 73 OR. L. REv. 133, 133 (1994) (examining thirteen statutes, including the
Uniform Act).
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corporations and partnerships 4 -they all allow the freedom of contract in
matters of internal governance that has always characterized partnership
law. Consequently, participants in these enterprises, together with their
attorneys, can allocate the economic and political rights and duties among
themselves in essentially any manner they choose.
This Article analyzes the positions of participants in limited liability
companies who do not take advantage of the internal governance freedoms
offered by the statute to plan for the kinds of breakdowns that occur in
business relationships. It also considers the position of parties to these
ventures who have agreed to a given power structure that, with the passage
of time, becomes unsatisfactory to them. Part I briefly discusses the
development of the limited liability company form and its roots in the
liberalized provisions of modem corporation and partnership law. In Part
II, the Article examines a variety of fact situations derived from partnership
and close corporation case law as examples of the kinds of disputes that
arise among the participants in closely held enterprises. The discussion
focuses on planning issues facing closely held enterprises under limited
liability company statutes, including the mode of operation and internal
division of authority, potential liability to third parties, the rights of new
entrants to the business, withdrawal rights of participants, and members'
fiduciary duties. Within the context of each situation, it considers various
possibilities or degrees of planning, in the form of an "Operating Agree-
ment,"' that the parties have undertaken and asks how particular disputes
will get resolved under the limited liability company statutes.
The Article concludes that it will be a mistake, in general, for parties to
rely on the "default settings" of the controlling limited liability company
statute. Such reliance can result in unpleasant surprises for which the
parties would not have bargained had they considered the possibility of
such occurrences at the time of formation. Because of the importance of
4. The special close corporation statutes introduced a similar trend toward statutory balkanization.
See Karjala, Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation, supra note 1, at 700-02; Karjala, A Second
Look, supra note 1, at 1264-67. It may be, however, that the continued trend toward liberality in the
general corporation statutes has eliminated the need for attorneys to rely on the special legislation. For
example, the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act, who in 1984 proposed a Model Statutory
Close Corporation Supplement for states wishing to distinguish between ordinary and "close"
corporations, reverted to the idea of a single, flexible general corporation law in 1992. See ROBERT W.
HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, CASES AND
MATERIAL.S 465-66 (5th ed. 1994).
5. The Delaware equivalent to the operating agreement is called a "limited liability company
agreement." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (Supp. 1994).
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individually bargained-for governance forms, the participation of a skilled
attorney at the formation stage is as important in the limited liability
company context as in the close corporation context.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITED LIABILTY COMPANY STATUTES
The standard model of the corporation has always called for managerial
supervision by a shareholder-elected board of directors, whose policies are
implemented by a group of appointed officers. When courts applied these
general corporation law principles as rigid "statutory norms" to closely held
incorporated enterprises, academic commentators began to call for special
close corporation legislation, and eventually a number of state legislatures
responded.6 Over the years, however, even the general corporation laws of
most states have been liberalized, so that almost any internal allocation of
powers, rights, and duties may be effected by the parties under those
statutes, provided that they follow appropriate formalities.7
In contrast to the traditional corporation structure, the standard partner-
ship model envisions an association of active partners, each of whom has
equal managerial authority to carry out ordinary business activities. Nearly
all internal partnership matters, however, are subject to variation in the
partnership agreement, and there is nothing that prohibits a partnership
from operating through a board of directors or executive committee if the
members so choose.
Consequently, business associates who negotiate their internal relation-
ships can today effect the result of their advance planning with either the
partnership or the corporate form. Thus, for planners, the choice of form
is determined by a balance of limited liability and tax considerations. The
difficult business-association-law questions arise when relationships among
the parties break down in a manner for which the parties did not plan. The
default positions of the corporate and partnership forms are very different,
and rigid application, particularly of the corporate default provisions, can
6. See Karjala, A Second Look, supra note 1, at 1207 n.l; Karjala, Analysis of Close Corporation
Legislation, supra note I, at 665-68. One of the first academic articles to call for legislative recognition
of the close corporation was Joseph L. Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27
MICH. L. REv. 273 (1928).
7. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 7.32 (1993) [hereinafter RMBCA
(permitting contractual division of power in unanimously approved article provisions or in unanimous
written shareholder agreements); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) (requiring management by a
board of directors except as otherwise provided in the articles).
1995]
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result in hardship or even injustice.'
The limited liability company seems to be a mixture of the two
traditional forms of business organization, and a somewhat different
mixture from one state to another. As a jurisprudential policy matter,
therefore, we might ask whether a new form was really necessary. From a
business organization point of view, the answer is, "Clearly not!" The
limited liability company form provides no additional internal structural
freedom not already available under the modem corporation and partnership
statutes. Furthermore, a new statute always brings interpretation uncertain-
ties that may take a long time for the courts to iron out,9 and this process
gets even longer when, as is the case with limited liability company
statutes, there are important statutory variations from state to state.
Widespread use of these statutes may also undercut the value of the
decades-long national jurisprudence that has developed under the general
corporation and partnership statutes."°
8. See generally Karjala, A Second Look, supra note I; Kadjala, Analysis of Close Corporation
Legislation, supra note 1. The partnership default provisions cause problems primarily when the
planning failure is coupled with an express agreement not to terminate the partnership or to continue
the partnership for a particular period of time. Absent such an agreement, partners are free to cause
dissolution at any time without penalty, which gives them a remedy if they feel oppressed by those in
control.
9. Business organization statutes in particular jurisdictions are only infrequently the subject of
judicial interpretation, and not even the general Delaware Corporation Law, by far the most richly
interpreted corporation statute, has a completely developed jurisprudence. See Kaijala, A Second Look,
supra note 1, at 1265 & n.230 (citing provisions of the Delaware Corporation Law that have not yet
been interpreted by the courts).
10. After the liberalization of the general corporation laws to allow freedom of contract in internal
matters, one of the strongest arguments against the adoption of special close corporation legislation was
the resulting fractionation of what had become a national corporation law. Overall statutory similarity
allows courts to rely on decisions from other jurisdictions in deciding cases of first impression in their
own states. Kaijala, A Second Look, supra note 1, at 1265-67; Kaijala, Analysis of Close Corporation
Legislation, supra note 1, at 700-02.
Of course, similarities between a state's limited liability company statute and either its general
corporation statute or its partnership statute may provide courts with an interpretative head start in
particular cases. The problem, however, is whether the court will apply appropriately the corporation
or partnership model or will simply take its cue from the statute itself, without adjustment for the
reasonable expectations of the parties. Some courts have shown rigidity in interpreting the special close
corporation statutes, to the detriment of the minority shareholders the statutes were designed to help.
E.g., Blount v. Taft, 246 S.E.2d 763 (1978) (allowing the majority shareholders to make a technical end
run around a statutorily authorized shareholder agreement); Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390
N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (denying minority shareholder participation in a buy-back of
shares from the majority family, notwithstanding the absence of a public market for the shares, because
the minority-shareholder-favorable judicial dissolution provisions defined "close corporation" in a way
that excluded the company in question). Similarly, rigidity in analogizing the limited liability company
statutes to either the corporate or partnership model will just as surely result in injustice in some cases.
[VOL. 73:455
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It seems that the only reason we have invited these difficulties is the
Treasury Department's obtuse notion that the four-factor analysis for
taxation as an "association" will be applied in a realistic manner only to
organizations that do not call themselves "corporations."'" Thus, "limited
partnerships" and now also "limited liability companies" will not be taxed
as associations if they lack two of the following four characteristics:
continuity of life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free
transferability. 2 Under the modem corporation statutes, two or more of
these characteristics can be, and often are, eliminated in incorporated
enterprises as well. 3 Nevertheless, if the participants continue to label
themselves a "corporation" by organizing under a well-understood general
corporation law, they will be taxed as an association. Now, by changing the
label to "limited liability company" but otherwise organizing as they are
free to do under the corporation statute, they magically change their tax
status. Myopic fixation on labels by federal bureaucrats has thus driven an
entire movement to a new business organization form, and all of the
jurisprudential uncertainties and difficulties that come with it. 4
II. ANALYSIS OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DEFAULT SETTINGS
AND ASSOCIATED PLANNING PROBLEMS
Despite its overall jurisprudential drawbacks, the limited liability
company is here. Careful planning for the types of breakdowns in
relationships that typically occur in closely held business enterprises can
I1. See David C. Culpepper, Tax Aspects of Limited Liability Companies, 73 OR. L. REV. 5, 6
(1993). On the absence of a normative basis for their federal tax classification system, see Larry E.
Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417,
451-56 (1992).
12. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1993); Culpepper, supra note 11, at 6.
13. The parties can provide for dissolution at will or upon certain permitted withdrawals, for
example, as well as for share transfer restrictions and elimination of the board of directors. See, e.g.,
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 275 (1991); id. § 151 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
14. Another example illustrating the downside of our brand of federalism resulted from the
overreaching of lawyers for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) in their efforts to recover assets for failed banks and savings and loan associations.
Law and accounting firms seeking to protect themselves from the huge potential liabilities that can
result from these heavy-handed actions have persuaded many state legislatures to adopt the "limited
liability partnership" form, under which partners are no longer liable for the professional misconduct
of the other partners. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-215(B) (Supp. 1994). It would be an interesting
next step to see federal legislative preemption with respect to alleged misconduct in matters subject to
RTC or FDIC jurisdiction. Then the result of this state-federal chess game will be that only the ordinary
clients will be checkmated when they are defrauded by a judgment-proof member of the firm, a
fundamental change in our notion of professional responsibility.
19951
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obviate later legal problems for limited liability companies in the same way
that planning can now be effective through enforceable contracts in the
partnership and corporation settings. The question for consideration is how
courts and lawyers should address these issues when the parties have not
provided a clear contractual resolution to their eventual dispute or when
their contractual resolution works a long-term unfairness to members
outside of the company's control group. Among the issues that should be
considered are: the mode of operation and internal division of authority; the
relationship between the mode of operation and potential liability to third
parties; the rights of new entrants to the enterprise; oppression of inactive
members and their successors; and fiduciary duties of members toward each
other.
A. Mode of Operation and Division of Power
Most limited liability company statutes delegate internal management
issues to the operating agreement adopted by the parties.'5 The statutory
management provisions come into play only where the parties have not
agreed.' 6 In fact, it will be the rare case in which the default management
provisions govern exclusively, because the parties will usually have agreed
on something, if only implicitly. Moreover, important elements of their
agreement will often be gleaned from how the parties actually operated and
interacted with one another before the dispute arose.' 7 Nevertheless, a
brief look at the default positions under several statutes helps set the stage
for situations in which the parties attempt variations on the statutory theme.
Some limited liability company statutes follow the partnership model and
provide for governance in the ordinary course of business by the members
on a one-person, one-vote and majority rule basis. 8 Others follow the
15. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. The limited liability company operating
agreement is a very close analog of the partnership agreement in the partnership setting. See generally
REVISED UNiF. PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 101(5), 103 (1993) [hereinafter RUPA].
16. UNiF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 103(a) (1995) [hereinafter ULLCA] ("To the extent the operating
agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the members, managers, and
company.").
17. For example, in Katcher v. Ohsman, 97 A.2d 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953), plaintiff
asserted that he had come into the business as a one-third shareholder with the oral assurance that he
would have a veto power. Id. at 182. For 14 years, all business was conducted only upon unanimous
approval of the three participants. Id. When the other two then tried to remove him as both officer and
director by majority vote, the court accepted plaintiffs claims concerning the earlier oral agreement.
Id. at 183.
18. See, e.g., ULLCA § 405 (1995); ARm. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681 (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE
§ 53-623(1) (1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.130, 63.150(2) (Supp. 1994). Colorado does not expressly
460 [VOL. 73:455
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corporate law model more closely and provide for voting in accordance
with profit interests 9 or capital contributions.2 Not all can be "right" in
matching their default positions to the expectations of people who organize
limited liability companies without negotiating the allocation of rights and
duties and making explicit variations from their state's default mode.2'
Consider, for example, the simple problem of two persons, A and B, who
form a limited liability company.22 A contributes the initial capital and B
is deemed the active party managing the business. A and B orally agree
that they will have an equal say in the business and that B will earn her
41equal partner" status after two years. The implicit assumption is that B's
initial salary is below market to account for B's capital contribution. If a
disnute arises within the two-year period and A tries to fire B, B may be
out of luck in states like California or Delaware that require deviations
limit residual managerial power to the ordinary course of business. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-
401(2) (West Supp. 1994) (reserving management of the company's "business and affairs" to the
members absent an article provision vesting managerial power in managers). Minority interests adverse
to the majority in Colorado limited liability companies may find themselves frozen out of operations
or employment, and they may have no realistic avenue of escape if the operating agreement prohibits
resignation. Section 7-80-602 allows resignation at any time but provides for damages if resignation
breaches the operating agreement. Id. § 7-80-602.
19 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17103(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402
(Supp. 1994). In both states, these provisions are subject to variation only through an article provision
or a written operating agreement, CAL. CORP. CODE § 17005(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(6)
(defining a "limited liability company agreement" to be a written agreement). This may cause some
surpnses for people who actually want the partnership model but, as often happens, fail to specify their
choice with sufficient formality.
Like Colorado, see supra note 18, California does not require unanimous consent for matters outside
the ordinary course of business. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17103(a)(2) (requiring a unanimous vote only for
decisions to continue the business after dissolution, to approve transfers of membership interests and
admissions of the assignee as a member, and to amend the articles or the operating agreement); id.
§ 17103(a)(3) (setting a majority vote as sufficient in all other matters). Delaware's default position,
too, makes a greater than 50% interest controlling on all matters. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 18402. In
California or Delaware limited liability companies, therefore, a minority interest that has ceded the
statutory withdrawal right in the operating agreement may be vulnerable to freezeouts from employment
and other activity in the company.
20. Inouye, supra note 3, at 138 (citing statutes from Florida, Nevada, Virginia, and Wyoming).
2 1. Parties in one state may choose to organize under the limited liability company statute of
another, much as many corporations, both large and small, from many states now do under Delaware
law. It will take a long time, however, before lawyers understand limited liability company statutes well
enough to know which ones work best under which circumstances. Even more time will pass before
a single state statute is recognized as so superior to the others that it becomes the "Delaware" of limited
liability company statutes. Moreover, there may be practical, and even theoretical, barriers to out-of-state
formation. See Ribstein, supra note 11, at 474 n.258.
22, This example is based on a problem presented in one of the popular corporations casebooks.
HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 365.
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from the default voting provisions (based on profit interests) to be in
writing.' Moreover, even if B successfully resists A's termination efforts,
B will find herself without power to raise her salary to market value after
she has worked for two years to earn her capital contribution.
The statutes tend to permit major, if not total, variation from the
statutory default provision through member-adopted operating agreements,
although the statutes distinguish themselves into those that do24 and those
that do not25 require operating agreements to be in writing. For matters
that need not be in writing, even initially vague agreements may take more
concrete form by inference from actual operations, and this may be the
single most important feature of these statutes for participants seeking, for
example, to claim veto powers (i.e., that no nonunanimous actions will be
taken) or to maintain employment positions. On the other hand, A, in the
example considered above, is in a difficult position if he has ceded
managerial authority to B but feels that B's policies are running the
company into the ground. A could force liquidation, assuming it is a legally
viable choice for A (i.e., not explicitly or implicitly violative of the
operating agreement), but liquidation can wipe out any going-concern value
of the company and maybe its remaining assets in the process. Still, the
requirement that the operating agreement can be amended only by
unanimous consent 6 means that A is stuck with leaving B in charge
unless he can get a court to intervene.
Things get even murkier if the statute requires something to be in writing
23. See supra note 19.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (Supp. 1994).
25. ULLCA § 103(a) (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 601(11) (Supp. 1994); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17001(ab) (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 102(11) OVest Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE
§ 53-601(11) (1994); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.001(18) (Supp. 1994). California requires an article
provision or a written operating agreement to vary the default provisions on amending the operating
agreement, voting, meetings, appointment and removal of managers and officers, and indemnification.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17005(b). Colorado requires a written operating agreement to vary the statutory
requirement for unanimity for admission to membership or for participation of transferees of interests
in the management, to vary the statutory dissolution requirements, or to vary the other statutory
requirements for a writing. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-102(11) & 108(3).
26. See, e.g., ULLCA § 404(c)(1) (1995); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(C)(1) (Supp. 1994);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17103(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 53-623(2) (1994). Some of the
statutes, in their default position, may permit amendment of operating agreements by simple majority
vote. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.150(3)(c) (Supp. 1994). Even this would not help A in our
example, however, because A's vote does not constitute a majority. Of course, power to amend by
majority vote coupled with retention by A of majority voting power (e.g., until B earns her full capital
contribution) shifts the balance of power back to A and, in practice, nullifies any protection for
continued employment that B can expect from an operating agreement.
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and the parties agree only orally.27 Some courts undoubtedly will enforce
such oral agreements between the parties, at least as long as third-party
rights are not involved, in the manner of the progressive close corporation
cases.2 Other courts, however, will reason that a statutorily prescribed
method for accomplishing a particular result invalidates nonstatutory means
of reaching the same result.29 Consequently, it will be largely fortuitous
if the default statutory provisions on allocation of control in the limited
liability company actually match the expectations of the parties in a
particular case. Active participation of counsel at the formation stage seems
imperative.30
B. Mode of Operation and Third-Party Liability
Probably the major reason for the sudden development of limited liability
company statutes is the possibility of combining partnership flow-through
taxation with limited liability.31 Although limited liability companies
involve more formation formalities than partnerships, such as the filing of
articles,32 many people will wish to operate their limited liability compa-
nies with the informality of a partnership. They should realize, however,
that excessive informality, such as casual commingling of assets, may
jeopardize the very limited liability they seek in adopting the limited
liability company form.
Some limited liability company statutes deal expressly with the "piercing
the veil" or "alter ego" problem. California applies the corporate law rules
27. Operating agreements in Delaware must be in writing. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7)
(Supp. 1994).
28. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964) (upholding a nonunanimous agreement
among controlling members of close corporation that impinged on traditional board powers but affected
no third-party rights).
29 See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1992) (en banc) (refusing special
relief for minority shareholders in closely held enterprise that did not meet the statutory definition of
*close corpcration"); see also Kaijala, A Second Look, supra note 1, at 1254-55.
30 Allocating managerial control in the limited liability company context may be even more
complex than for traditional closely held corporations, because the parties will not be able to rely on
traditional concepts like the board of directors, common stock, preferred stock, share classifications, and
supermajority quorum and voting requirements. If the parties desire a more nearly corporate, as opposed
to partnership, structure, the attorney drafting the operating agreement will essentially have to define
all of these concepts anew.
31. See generally ULLCA prefatory note (1995) ("The allure of the limited liability company is
its unique ability to bring together in a single business organization the best features of all other
business forms-properly structured, its owners obtain both a corporate-styled liability shield and the
pass-through tax benefits of a partnership.").
32. ULLCA § 202(a) (1995).
1995]
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for piercing the corporate veil to limited liability companies.33 Colorado
also adopts the corporate law jurisprudence, with the additional proviso that
failure to follow formalities is not a ground for imposing personal
liability.34 The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act provides simply
that failure to observe the usual corporate formalities is not a ground for
imposing personal liability.35 The Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, and Oregon
statutes do not expressly adopt the corporate law rules for piercing.36 For
all states, however, the policy reasons for piercing the corporate veil when
justice requires apply with equal force to limited liability companies.
Consequently, we may assume that the courts will in fact pierce the
"limited liability company veil" even in states whose statutes do not
explicitly adopt the corporate law rules.
This creates a planning problem: clients must be made to understand the
need to maintain a distinction between themselves and the company. If the
company alone is to be liable for its debts, it must be given some
independent economic existence that is respected by the parties. The formal
structure of corporations, while not always followed in closely held
enterprises, can serve as a useful reminder that the corporate assets, for
example, belong to the corporation and not to the individual sharehold-
ers.37 Conversely, elimination of formal structural differences between the
members of limited liability companies and the company itself can blur or
even eliminate in the minds of the human participants the notion that the
33. CAL. COP. CODE 17101(b) (West Supp. 1995). The statute fiirther states that failure to hold
meetings or to observe the formalities associated with meetings is not a factor in piercing where the
constituent instruments do not expressly require the holding of meetings, Id. This purported exception
is unfortunate, because it invites a negative implication that the failure to observe these formalities is
a factor if the operating agreement does require meetings. In the corporation setting, the failure to
observe internal governance formalities is rarely the sole basis for piercing the limited-liability veil. See
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686 n.14 (4th Cir. 1976);
cf. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036,
1067-68 (1991) (finding that failure to follow formalities is not as good a predictor of piercing
determinations as a number of other factors).
34. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-107 (West Supp. 1994).
35. ULLCA § 303(b) (1995).
36. However, Arizona and Oregon, along with Colorado, do adopt various versions of the
corporate law rule for preincorporation liability. ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-652 (Supp. 1994) (liability
for "persons who assume to act as a limited liability company without authority to do so'); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7-80-105 (West Supp. 1994) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.054 (Supp. 1994) (liability for
"persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a limited liability company" with knowledge of its
nonexistence).
37. See Karjala, Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation, supra note 1, at 678-80, 699
(discussing f6rmal structures in closely held corporations).
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company is a separate legal entity.
C. New Entrants in the Company
It is common for the participants in closely held enterprises to invite new
members to join after formation, often pursuant to oral (and vague)
arrangements.3" In contrast to the formation stage, attorneys often are not
consulted when the deal is struck. In the partnership setting, admission of
a new partner normally requires unanimous consent of the partners,39 but
no particular formality is required for the consents. The corporate setting
will usually involve some explicit negotiation for acquisition of shares by
the new entrant, either from the corporation or from a departing sharehold-
er, but often the deal is made without any further changes in the constituent
instruments. When disputes arise concerning the nature and enforceability
of these transactions, perhaps many years later, courts may have to
determine the reasonable expectations of the parties using little more than
evidence of actual operations to guide them as to the actual terms of the
deal.'
The limited liability company statutes tend to treat the question of new
entrants in some detail. The default position is typically unanimous consent
for admission, whether the new interest is issued by the company or
acquired from an existing member.4 The situation in these cases is the
same as the default position in the partnership, and if unanimous consent
is expressed the admission will be effective and enforceable, to the extent
the court can actually decipher the agreement. California and Delaware
require, however, in addition to unanimous consent, that the new entrant
become a party to the operating agreement or that her admission be
reflected on the company records.42 We can be certain that formal
38. See, e.g., B & B Equip. Co. v. Bowen, 581 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (coupling an
employment agreement with a stock purchase agreement, so that breach of the former was a ground for
rescission of the latter); Katcher v. Ohsman, 97 A.2d 180, 183-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953)
(treating an agreement to take action only by unanimous consent as an implied bylaw).
39. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g) (1914) [hereinafter UPA]; RUPA § 401(i) (1993).
40. See Kajala, A Second Look, supra note 1, at 1233-37 (discussing new entrants in close
corporations).
41. E.g., ULLCA §§ 404(c)(7), 503(a) (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 731(B) (Supp. 1994);
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-701 to 702(1) (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.245(2) (Supp.
1994); see also IDAHO CODE § 53-638(1) to 640(1) (1994) (requiring unanimous consent unless
otherwise provided in the operating agreement).
42. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17100(a) (West Supp. 1995) (acquisition from the company); id.
§ 17303(a) (acquisition from a member). Both California provisions require that the new entrant become
a party to the operating agreement. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-301(b) (Supp. 1994)
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accession to the operating agreement and reflection on the company records
will not always be followed. When a dispute later arises, one side or the
other will point to the missing formal action as a basis for denying the new
entrant's membership in the company.
D. Oppression of Inactive Members and Their Successors
A major problem for closely held businesses that involve both active and
inactive participants is that individual participants' goals and needs may
change over the life of the business. Family businesses pass on to the next
generation, often with shifts of control that lead to a falling out among the
participants. 3 Divorce can upset the original agreement concerning salary
arrangements for the active party.' The absence of dividend payments to
minority members while the controlling parties are receiving hefty salaries
and benefits begins to rankle.4 5 The financing partner who fails to
negotiate a cap on his required contributions but has otherwise ceded
control to the active partner becomes uneasy as costs rise beyond
expectations.46 The basic jurisprudential problem in these and similar
situations is defining the circumstances in which, and the extent to which,
parties in these predicaments are entitled to judicial relief.
Partnership law addresses the problem by giving partners the power to
withdraw at any time, coupled with a right to a payout of the value of their
interests.4 7 Of course, a withdrawing partner may be liable for damages if
she withdraws in contravention of the partnership agreement or prior to the
end of the agreed term or project,48 and this can be a strong disincentive
to the exercise of the power.49 Nevertheless, whatever penalty arises from
wrongful withdrawal is the result of express bargaining among the
participants, which reduces the flavor of unfairness in many cases.
Traditional corporation law provides no power of withdrawal for outside,
(acquisition from the company); Id. § 704(l) (acquisition from a member). Both Delaware provisions
require that the new entrant's admission be reflected on the records of the company.
43. See, e.g., Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993) (falling out between two sisters
after the husband of one took fall control of the business upon the death of the father).
44. See, e.g., Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974).
45. See, e.g., Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
46. Collins v. Lewis, 283 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
47. UPA §§ 31(l)(b), 31(2), 42 (1914); RUPA §§ 601(1), 701 (1993). The 1914 UPA speaks of
events of "dissolution," while the 1993 statute's notion of withdrawal from the enterprise is referred to
as "dissociation." The distinctions are largely unimportant for purposes of the present discussion, so I
try to use the term "withdrawal" to include the relevant events under both versions of the UPA.
48. UPA § 38(2)(a)(II) (1914); RUPA § 701(c) (1993).
49. See Karjala, A Second Look, supra note 1, at 1229 n.102.
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noncontrolling shareholders, with the result that substantial investments can
be tied up indefinitely with minimal or even no return." Rights of
withdrawal can, of course, result from negotiations and appropriate
placement in the constituent instruments or shareholder agreement, but the
long-term nature of these business relationships often means that the
circumstances leading to the current dispute were not foreseeable (or in any
event not foreseen) at the formation stage. The law's response has been the
creation of a mechanism for judicial dissolution in a proceeding initiated
by a shareholder where those in control have acted in an "oppressive"
manner." "Oppression" is interpreted in terms of the reasonable expecta-
tions of the shareholders. 2
The limited liability company statutes address this problem from both
ends, sometimes, perhaps, allowing justice to fall through the crack in the
middle. First, their default position follows the partnership model by
providing an absolute right of withdrawal, which leads to dissolution and
winding up of the business unless the operating agreement provides
otherwise or the remaining members consent unanimously to its continua-
tion. 3 Some limited liability company statutes continue the partnership
model by allowing even withdrawals that are in breach of a provision of
the operating agreement but holding the withdrawing member liable for
damages.'M Other states allow the operating agreement to remove the right
of withdrawal completely (placing noncontrol members of the company in
the same position as the traditional corporate minority shareholder). 5
50. This problem, referred to as minority shareholder oppression, has a voluminous literature. See,
e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699
(1993).
51. RMBCA § 14.30(2)(iii) (1993).
52. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1176-77, 1179 (1984); see Kaijala, Analysis
of Close Corporation Legislation, supra note 1, at 674-77.
53. See, e.g., ULLCA §§ 602(a), 801(3) (1995); ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-734, 29-781(A)
(Supp. 1994); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17252(a) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring six months' written notice
before withdrawal); id. § 17350(d); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-602, 7-80-801(1)(c) (West Supp.
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-603 (Supp. 1994) (requiring six months' written notice before
withdrawal); id. § 18-801(4); IDAHO CODE § 53-641(3) (Supp. 1994) (requiring 30 days' written notice
before withdrawal); id. § 53-642(3); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.205(1)() (Supp. 1994) (requiring six months'
written notice before withdrawal); id. § 63.621(4) (providing that right of continuation must be in a
written operating agreement).
54. ULLCA § 602(c) (1995); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-734 (Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 7-80-602 (West Supp. 1994).
55. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17252(a) (West Supp. 1995) (operating agreement may deny withdrawal
right or specify remedies for wrongful withdrawal); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-603 (Supp. 1994)
(operating agreement may provide that a member may not resign prior to winding up); IDAHO CODE
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The limited liability company statutes will thus raise few problems of
oppression for noncontrol members of the company, or their successors, to
the extent the operating agreement does not limit or deny withdrawal rights.
An unhappy member can simply withdraw and be paid the value of her
interest. 6 The problems will arise when the operating agreement does limit
or deny withdrawal rights. Given the liquidity difficulties that an absolute
right of withdrawal can generate,57 most attorneys will probably advise
their clients to include withdrawal rights limitations in the operating
agreement.58 This pattern may raise the same issues over which so much
§ 53-641(3) (1994) (operating agreement may deny power to withdraw; moreover, if a member has
power to withdraw, any withdrawal in breach of the operating agreement gives rise to damages); OR.
REv. STAT. § 63-205 (Supp. 1994) (articles or operating agreement may deny power of voluntary
withdrawal; moreover, any power to withdraw exercised in breach of the articles or the operating
agreement gives rise to damages).
56. Such freedom of withdrawal does raise, however, the problem of premature termination of the
company at the behest of a minority member.
57. See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture:
A Consideration ofthe Relative Permanence ofPartnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV.
1, 69 (1982).
58. Some statutes require that limited liability companies have two or more members, which can
also affect the analysis of withdrawal rights. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-632(A)(3) (Supp.
1994) (requiring a statement in the articles that there will be two or more members upon formation);
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17001(t), 17050(b) (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(5) (Supp.
1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.001(12) (Supp. 1994). It is not clear how this requirement affects a power
to continue the business upon the death or withdrawal of a member from a two-member company.
These statutes provide that death, withdrawal, etc., cause a dissolution "except as otherwise provided
in the operating agreement," which implies power to continue the business if the operating agreement
so provides. What is unclear is whether any such continuation of the business by the single remaining
member is as a sole proprietorship (with unlimited liability) or as a limited liability company. The two-
member requirement implies the former, which means the loss of limited liability. The Oregon statute
reinforces this interpretation by providing, in addition, for continuation of the business upon the vote
of specified percentages in the operating agreement if there are at least two remaining members. OR.
REV. STAT. § 63.621(4). On the other hand, some statutes expressly provide that a limited liability
company continues to exist until cancellation of its certificate. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17356(3); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(b). This language implies the ongoing existence of the limited liability
company if the business is continued pursuant to the operating agreement. Such an interpretation leaves
open, however, just what the two-member requirement means in these states. Arizona poses yet different
interpretation problems, because its statute only requires a statement in the articles that there are two
or more members at the time of formation. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-632(A). Perhaps Arizona does
not even have an ongoing two-member requirement.
Some limited liability company statutes have provisions analogous to Model Business Corporation
Act § 139 (1969) or RMBCA § 2.04 (1993) covering liability for "preincorporation transactions." Eg.,
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-652; OR. REv. STAT. § 63.054. A single remaining member exercising
a power to continue the business might also be inviting liability under these provisions, on the ground
that she is acting on behalf of a nonexistent limited liability company (nonexistent because it no longer
has two members).
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ink has been spilled in the close corporation minority shareholder
oppression debate, complicated by the absence in many LLC statutes of fair
and reasonable provisions for judicial dissolution.
We might consider a few examples based on corporation case law. A
famous case is In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc.,59 in which two equal
shareholders operated a very profitable music publishing business for many
years. The business generated good earnings on essentially no fixed assets,
which permits the conclusion that its success was based largely on the
personal goodwill built up over the years by its two active participants.
Upon Neidorff's death, his shares devolved on his wife, who happened to
be the sister of the other shareholder, Radom. Brother and sister were on
very bad terms with one another, and Radom sought judicial assistance in
the form of a dissolution order.
It is clear that neither of the extreme remedies-immediate dissolution
or permanent sharing by Mrs. Neidorff in future profits-is equitable.
Immediate dissolution would allow Radom to make off with all of the
company's current goodwill, half of which (presumably) was built up by
Neidorff and rightfully belongs to Mrs. Neidorff. On the other hand, the
continued goodwill over the long term will be increasingly the result of
Radom's efforts, so Mrs. Neidorff's claim to share in the profits should
properly attenuate with time. The best solution is a buyout of Mrs.
Neidorff's interest at a price that takes into consideration the value of the
company's goodwill at the time of Neidorffs death.
While the corporate statute, as interpreted by the New York Court of
Appeals, led to a resolution overly favorable to Mrs. Neidorff,6° the limited
liability company statutes would have led automatically to the solution
favoring Radom."' Because the limited liability default settings mirror the
withdrawal provisions of partnership law, Neidorff's death would have
caused dissolution of the company and a sale of its assets. There is no
reason to think that anyone other than Radom would have bid on the
goodwill, because it was personal to him, so the (minimal) existing assets
would simply have been divided and he could have gone his separate way.
Mrs. Neidorff would have received nothing for the value of Neidorff s
share of the goodwill. Consequently, it is as imperative in the limited
liability company context as in the corporate context for the parties to
59. 119 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 1954).
60. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the dissolution petition and upheld
Mrs. Neidorff's right to share in the continuing profits of the firm. Id. at 565.
61. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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negotiate a buyout provision, before the events triggering dissolution occur,
that insures fair treatment of both the departing member and those who
continue active in the business.
Another famous corporate law case suitable for testing the operation of
limited liability company statutes is Kruger v. Gerth,62 in which the New
York Court of Appeals denied the dissolution demand of a minority
shareholder who had inherited forty-six percent of a company with a net
worth of $100,000. The minority shareholder complained that the company
perpetually showed negligible earnings after payment of the salary (and
bonus) of the majority shareholder. The result was that the majority
shareholder could make permanent use of the minority shareholder's
$46,000 investment in the company to generate a return payable solely to
himself.
Had this been a limited liability company operating under the statutory
default settings, death of the original minority shareholder would have
triggered dissolution and eliminated the problem. If, however, the original
parties had agreed that death would not trigger a dissolution and that the
remaining party could continue the business on death, the Kruger plaintiff,
the minority member's successor, may not even be a member of the
company, an even worse outcome than under today's corporate law.63
Even under a statute that permits withdrawal in breach of the operating
agreement," the successor who is not a member could not force a
buyback of her interest by withdrawing, because there is no membership
from which to withdraw. Moreover, as a nonmember, the successor may
62. 210 N.E.2d 355 (N.Y. 1965).
63. Admission of an assignee to membership requires unanimous consent of the other members.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. Under the default positions, assignees of interests in
limited liability companies who are not admitted to membership simply receive whatever distributions
their assignor would have been entitled to receive and have no right to participate in management.
ULLCA § 502 (1995); AiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-732(A) (Supp. 1994); CAL. CORP. CODE §
17301(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1995); COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-702(1) (,Vest Supp. 1994); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(a), (b)(1) (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-636(b)-(c) (1994); OR. REV.
STAT. § 63.249(2)-(3) (Supp. 1994). Some statutes expressly give the representative of a deceased
member only the rights of an assignee. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-704; IDAHO CODE § 53-639.
The ULLCA and the Arizona statute have no express reference to the rights of a deceased member's
representative, which presumably leaves representatives in the position of an assignee as well.
California, Delaware, and Oregon give the deceased member's representative all the rights of a member
for the purpose of settling the member's estate. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17304(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 18-705; OR. REV. STAT. § 63.265. In these states, the deceased member's representative would have
standing to petition for dissolution as a member, for example, but that power would (presumably) not
pass on to the successor to the decedent's interest in the company.
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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lack technical standing to seek judicial dissolution.65
As discussed above, the judicial dissolution provisions in the corporation
setting have become the primary weapon for the oppressed minority
shareholder to obtain a return of her investment." The default position of
the limited liability company statutes normally permits relatively free
withdrawal by members.67 Therefore, minority or inactive member
oppression should not be a significant problem for companies operating in
the statutory default setting. Possibly because the drafters of these statutes
viewed the limited liability company primarily as a partnership (with
partnership law's nonwaivable power to force dissolution), the judicial
dissolution provisions in some of the statutes are more stringent than the
modem corporation statutes and appear to leave less to the discretion of the
court.6" The drafters of these limited liability company statutes seem to
have forgotten that they allow absolute denial of withdrawal rights in the
operating agreement. In these circumstances, not just successors of
members but even members themselves may find courts unwilling to come
to their assistance because of the limited circumstances in which the
statutes authorize the dissolution remedy.
For example, in Arizona, Delaware, and Oregon, a court may order
dissolution in an action by a member if it is established that it is "not
reasonably practicable to carry on the business" according to the articles or
an operating agreement.69 Yet it is often possible to carry on the business
while freezing a minority interest out of any return. Colorado has no
provision for judicial dissolution on application by a member under any
circumstances. Idaho provides for judicial dissolution on application by a
member when the acts of those in control are "illegal, oppressive or
fraudulent and... irreparable injury" is being threatened to or suffered by
65. The statutes seem generally to permit judicial dissolution upon the petition of a "member." See,
e.g., ULLCA § 801(5) (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785(A) (Supp. 1994); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17351 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802(a) (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-643
(1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.661(2) (Supp. 1994). Colorado has no provision for judicial dissolution,
even upon petition, by a member. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-808 (West Supp. 1994) (permitting
judicial dissolution and liquidation in actions by the attorney general, a creditor, or the company itself).
66 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
67, See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
68. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (Supp. 1994) (allowing a court to order dissolution
of a limited liability company where it is "not reasonably practicable to carry on the business") with
RMBCA § 14.30 (1993) (providing various grounds for judicial dissolution of a corporation, including
oppression and deadlock).
69. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785 (Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (Supp.
1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.661(2) (Supp. 1994).
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the company." Idaho's conjunctive requirement for irreparable injury
severely narrows the modem corporate grounds for judicial dissolution. Of
the statutes I have considered, only the Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act follows the modem, liberal corporate model permitting judicial
dissolution when those in control act in an "illegal, oppressive, fraudulent
or unfairly prejudicial" manner toward the petitioning member."1 Califor-
nia, perhaps, comes close by permitting judicial dissolution in an action by
a member when dissolution is "reasonably necessary for the protection of
the rights or interests of the complaining members" or vhen those in
control have "knowingly countenanced persistent and pervasive fraud,
mismanagement, or abuse of authority."72
Even if we assume that the operation of the company in Kruger v. Gerth
would today be fairly labelled "oppressive" under the modem corporation
statutes, a minority member of a limited liability company in similar
circumstances who has ceded withdrawal rights could expect no judicial
assistance in Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, or Oregon.73 The
problem is not that the business cannot practicably be carried out under the
operating agreement. It is rather that the operating agreement is inequitably
benefiting only one of the members, essentially in perpetuity, and it is
unfair to allow the situation to continue indefinitely. In other words, the
limited liability company statutes in these states allow no leeway to
members who make a bad initial deal, or to their successors. Even in
California, relief would not depend on the finding of "oppression," a term
with which courts have familiarity from the corporate context, but rather
on an interpretation of the entirely new phrase "reasonably necessary for
the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining members."74
70. IDAHO CODE § 53-643(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
71. ULLCA § 801(5)(v) (1995). The Uniform Act also permits dissolution in an action by a
member for unreasonable frustration of economic purpose (which might cover the Kruger v. Gerth
situation discussed in the text accompanying supra note 62, assuming that the decedent member's
successor has standing to bring the action), if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business
with a particular member or in conformance with the operating agreement, or a dissociated member's
interest has not been duly purchased when required. Id. § 801(5)(i)-(iv).
72. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(2), (5) (West Supp. 1995). California also permits the action if it
is impracticable to carry on the business in conformance with the operating agreement, when the
business has been abandoned, or when the management is deadlocked or subject to internal dissension.
Id. § 17351(1), (3), (4).
73. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
74. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(2) (West Supp. 1995). What the majority shareholder in Kruger
knowingly countenanced was clearly "persistent" and perhaps even "pervasive," but it is difficult to
label as "fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority." See id. § 17351(5). Note that a California court
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Only the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, among the statutes
considered here, clearly gets to the "right" result-allowing judicial
dissolution notwithstanding that the parties have agreed to give up their
right to withdraw at will-on the facts of Kruger (and then only on the
assumption that the decedent member's successor has standing).
Minority interests can be particularly vulnerable in states like California
and Delaware, which require operating agreements to be in writing and
which permit in their default positions all business decisions to be made by
majority vote.75 Consider the holder of a minority interest in such a
limited liability company who has ceded, in the operating agreement, his
statutory withdrawal right but is brought into the business under an oral
promise of continued employment. Technically, the oral promise cannot be
part of the operating agreement. Thus, there is no breach or amendment of
the operating agreement if the majority interest later terminates the minority
member's employment. Judicial dissolution is available in Delaware only
if it is impracticable to carry on the business under the operating agree-
ment, which is not the case on these facts. In California, judicial assistance
will be available if the court determines that dissolution is "reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights and interests" of the minority
party. Whether that is the case on these facts depends on whether the
minority party has a "right" to or "interest" in employment, notwithstanding
that this right or interest is not guaranteed by the operating agreement.
There is a fairly clear lesson here: parties who form limited liability
companies and who seek to protect their investments against loss due to
premature termination by denying in the operating agreement the statutory
default right of free withdrawal should at the same time make explicit
provision for withdrawal at some time or under some conditions before
ceding operational control to a subset of their group. This will not be an
easy drafting job, nor can we expect that the parties who draft limited
withdrawal rights will envision accurately all of the circumstances that will
actually develop over time. The best general solution would be to amend
the limited liability company statutes to follow the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act's provisions on judicial dissolution (probably with
could read the "fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority" language as a narrowing of the corporate
law "oppression" ground for judicial dissolution. If it did so, then even if the decedent member's
successor has standing to bring the action, the court could also conclude that so long as the operating
agreement is not breached, no rights or interests of the complainant are in need of protection, and
thereby deny judicial dissolution under either subsection (2) or subsection (5).
75. See supra note 19.
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some express provision for operation-of-law successors in interest who are
not "members").
E. Fiduciary Duties in General
Partners have both a specific duty to account for profits earned from any
use of partnership property76 and a vaguer, more general duty of loyal-
ty." In the corporation setting, directors must sanitize self-dealing
transactions either by securing the approval of the independent shareholders
or directors or by proving the fairness of the transaction.78 In addition, a
growing body of case law for close corporations establishes a general
majority shareholder fiduciary duty to treat the other shareholders fairly.79
Such a duty also has been applied by at least some courts to minority
shareholders.80
It is, of course, too early to predict what kinds of common law fiduciary
duty principles the courts will develop for limited liability companies. The
statutorily prescribed duties, however, exhibit a broad dispersion. In
California, members of limited liability companies owe each other the same
duties as partners." Idaho also adopts the partnership principle by
requiring, except as otherwise provided in the operating agreement or with
the consent of a majority of the disinterested members, an accounting for
transactions connected with the conduct of the company or any use of its
property. 2 The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act imposes a similar
76. UPA § 21 (1914); RUPA § 404(b)(1) (1993).
77. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) ("Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is... the standard of behavior."). The latest version of the UPA attempts to
restrict the duty of loyalty to its statutory provisions. RUPA § 404(a) (1993).
78. RMBCA §§ 8.60-8.63 (1993).
79. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (noting that members
in close corporations owe each other a duty of good faith more stringent than the standard of fiduciary
duty between corporate directors and shareholders). Courts have generally followed Donahue in
requiring control groups in closely held corporations to allow minority shareholder participation in stock
redemption transactions. See HAMLTON, supra note 4, at 436-38. Other courts have extended the
Donahue principle to assist shareholders seeking to maintain a previously agreed balance of voting
power. Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941, 945-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Hallahan
v. Haltom Corp., 385 N.E.2d 1033, 1034 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
80. E.g., Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 802-03 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
(holding that a minority shareholder who possessed veto power had a duty not to refuse dividends
where the result of refusal was possible investigation by the Internal Revenue Service).
81. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17150, 17153 (West Supp. 1995).
82. IDAHO CODE § 53-622(2) (1994). If the company is managed by managers, an Idaho member
who is not a manager has no fiduciary duties when acting solely in the capacity of a member. rd. § 53-
622(3). Idaho also imposes a duty of care, with liability limited to gross negligence or willful
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duty of loyalty that is not subject to elimination in the operating agree-
ment. 3 It also imposes duties to refrain from dealing with the company
as an adverse party and to refrain from competing with the company,'
and explicitly provides that there are no fiduciary duties other than those
covered by the statute. 5 The Uniform Act also specifies that a member
does not violate a duty merely because his conduct furthers his own
interest.8 6 Colorado and Oregon impose only a duty of care. 7 Delaware
does not expressly incorporate any duties but provides that, with respect to
whatever duties the law imposes, there is no liability to the extent of good
faith reliance on the operating agreement and that the duties can be
expanded or restricted by the operating agreement.8" The Arizona statute
makes no reference to duties of members at all. Again, the best way to test
these provisions is by way of example.
In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 9 the controlling family used
corporate assets to buy back shares from a family member at what we may
assume was fair market value. The minority shareholder did not complain
about the price or claim that the corporation had a better use for the money.
Rather, she claimed that she should have been permitted to participate in
the deal pro rata, because there was no other market for her shares. The
court held for the plaintiff on the ground that the controlling family was
using the corporate assets to create a market for the company's shares and
that these assets should be used for the benefit of the shareholders generally
and not simply those in control. 9°
In the corporate setting, control can be finely tuned through share
ownership, so a buyout of only some of the shares can leave the same
misconduct. Id. § 53-622(1).
83. ULLCA §§ 103(b)(2), 409(bXl) (1995). The operating agreement may, however, identify
"categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable," and
specify the number of disinterested members who may ratify upon full disclosure. Id. § 103(2)(i)-(ii).
The Uniform Act also imposes a duty of care, limiting liability to cases of grossly negligent, reckless,
or willful conduct or knowing violations of law. Id. § 409(c).
84. Id. § 409(b)(2)-(3). On the other hand, a member is permitted to "lend money to and transact
other business with the company." Id. § 409(0. In addition, all duties must be discharged consistently
with the "obligation of good faith and fair dealing." Id. § 409(d).
85. Id. § 409(a).
86. Id. § 409(e).
87 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-401(2), 7-80-406(1) (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 63.130, 63.155 (Supp. 1994). These statutes require members to carry out their duties in good faith,
using ordinary care and having the best interests of the company at heart.
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1 101(c) (Supp. 1994).
89. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
90. Id. at 520.
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parties (or their relatives) in control, as was the case in Donahue. The only
result in the real world is that corporate assets flow into the pockets of
some shareholders (related to those in control) but not others. The
preferential buyout issue does not often arise in the partnership context,
because most partners are active in the business and share equally in
control. Similarly, we would not expect the issue to arise in the limited
liability company context to the extent the company actually operates on
the traditional partnership model: one-person, one-vote; relatively even
distribution of profits; and relatively equal rights on dissolution. The
limited liability company statutes, however, make it possible to issue
ownership interests just like corporate shares,9 and companies constructed
in this manner may be indistinguishable from closely held corporations as
a practical matter.
Suppose a limited liability company so constructed engages in a
Donahue-type buyout from relatives of the controlling members. What
relief, if any, will be available to complaining minority members? The
California statute's broad reference to partnership fiduciary duties,92
notwithstanding the absence of this transaction in the partnership setting,
certainly would permit the court to adopt the Donahue rationale should it
be so inclined. Similarly, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act's
prohibition on dealings adverse to the company, 93 coupled with the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing," may be a ground for court-
ordered equal treatment. Idaho's requirement for an accounting9" may also
justify judicial intervention, unless the deal is approved by the disinterested
members. Note, however, that if the Idaho limited liability company is
managed by managers and the family member whose interest is the subject
of the buyout is not a manager, the transaction literally falls outside the
language of the statute.96
The complete absence of any affirmative statutory reference to fiduciary
duties in the Arizona and Delaware statutes may leave the courts freer to
develop traditional fiduciary duty principles following either the partnership
or corporation law models, whichever is most appropriate to the case at
91. See, e.g., ULLCA § 502(c) (1995).
92. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 17153 (West Supp. 1995); see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
93. ULLCA § 409(b)(2) (1995); see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
94. ULLCA § 409(d) (1995).
95. IDAHO CODE § 53-622(2) (1994).
96. Id. § 53-622(3) (providing that such a member has no duties to the company or the other
members "solely by reason of acting" in his capacity as a member).
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hand. The express inclusion of duty-of-care provisions in Colorado and
Oregon, however, may incline the court to believe that it is restricted in
developing common law duties. Even with respect to garden-variety self-
dealing transactions, the courts in many states may have to reinvent the
traditional rules requiring disinterested member approval and the allocation
of the burden of proof.
III. CONCLUSION
The limited liability company should under no circumstances be treated
as a "one size fits all" form of business organization. Even the small
sample of limited liability company statutes considered in this study shows
wide variety in many crucial provisions. Moreover, within any given
jurisdiction it is unlikely that the default provisions on allocation of internal
control, admission of new members, withdrawal rights and judicial
dissolution, and fiduciary duty will match those desired or expected by
particular people electing to do business in this new form. To the extent the
parties can foresee future sources of friction, careful drafting of the
operating agreement can provide an a priori resolution to the problem.
Many small businesses, however, will elect not to assume the expense of
negotiating, and hiring an attorney to draft, a carefully worded operating
agreement. In addition, over the long term the implementation of even
bargained-for initial agreements may work an injustice, as the needs and
expectations of the parties change or their interests pass on to successors.
The extent to which courts will be willing and able to "do justice" in these
situations is likely to be hampered in many jurisdictions by inadequate
provisions for judicial dissolution at the instance of an "oppressed" member
or member's successor and by undeveloped concepts of fiduciary duty in
the limited liability company context. In short, careful planning is
imperative, but it may not be enough.
As a business organization form, the limited liability company provides
nothing (besides uncertainty) not already available under the partnership
and corporation statutes. The only benefit seems to be pass-through taxation
for small corporations without the limitations applicable to S corporations.
If the federal and state governments could communicate with one another,
they surely could have achieved this result without the difficulties and
uncertainties of an entirely new form of business organization.
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